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Harmless but disgusting moral violations can be justified as harmful to others due to the 
negative emotions they elicit. The relationship between the emotions of anger and disgust and 
the harm associated to these emotions as a result of a moral violation was investigated. 
Results showed that a disgusting moral violation (taboo violation) described as harmless to 
others is more related to disgust that to anger. Such violation created a presumption of harm 
of three different types: to the community, nature, and the individual. Disgust was a mediator 
between the taboo violation and the presumption of harm to nature, whereas anger was a 
mediator between the taboo violation and the presumption of harm to the individual. In 
general, results also showed that in moral violations that are harmless to others, the emotions 
of anger and disgust allow people to presume harm to symbolic entities such as nature and the 
community as a result of such violations. 
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Disgusting but harmless moral violations are perceived as harmful due to the negative 
emotions they elicit 
 
The relationship between emotional reactions, moral violations and the evaluation of such 
action has experienced an important change in recent years. Until recently, most research 
focused on morality gave its attention on the rational processes that were presumed to be 
controlled and conscious (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971), leaving emotions and intuitions to play a 
secondary role at best (Haidt, 2001). More contemporary research investigating morality and 
moral judgement generally endorse that emotions and intuitions are a crucial component in 
the process of moral judgement and in the research of morality as a whole (Haidt, 2003). 
Some theoretical models now propose close relationships between the nature of the moral 
violations and specific emotions. For example, the CAD hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, 
& Haidt, 1999) suggests a correspondence between a triad of moral violation domains 
(Community, Autonomy and Divinity) and three specific emotions (Contempt, Anger and 
Disgust). This model proposes that an action that violates a moral norm of the code of 
divinity—related to food, purity and the sanctity of the body—should elicit mostly, if not 
uniquely, disgust. 
Although it is now accepted that emotions play a role in our evaluations and judgements 
(Damasio, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999), it is not clear how different emotions have different 
effects on the way we judge moral violations. For example, anger and disgust are two 
emotions that are frequently mentioned as responses towards moral violations. Disgust has 
been portrayed in several different forms, from core disgust to sociomoral disgust (Simpson, 
Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006). These wide range of ‘functions’ of disgust means that it 
can be implicated in a large number of phenomena, from the protection against contaminated 
food (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999), to a justification for murder (Kahan, 1998). Anger 
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has been mostly referred in moral psychology as a response to an unjustified insult to one or 
on behalf of someone else and a common response to unfairness (Haidt, 2003). 
 
Anger, Disgust and Presumption of Harm 
 
The close relationship between the two ‘other-condemning’ emotions (Haidt, 2003), anger 
and disgust, as well as the wide range of elicitors associated to them present an important 
challenge in moral judgement, particularly when these moral violations do not have negative 
consequences to others such as in the case of consensual homosexual relationships. One of 
the consequences associated to harmless moral violations is the so called ‘moral 
dumbfounding effect’. This effect refers to the condemnation of moral violations even when 
the person is unable to provide reasons to evaluate the action in a negative manner. Generally 
people condemn violations to moral norms without negative consequences to others, even 
when they can provide reasons to condemn such actions (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 
2004). It has been reported that this effect may be an intuition, allowing people to quickly and 
effortlessly reach a moral judgement without he need or reasons. According to the social 
intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001). People reach a moral judgement based on fast intuitions, and 
then use reasons to justify the negative evaluation. More specifically on emotions, the 
presumption of harm model (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007) suggests that people ascribe 
harm to moral violations that elicit negative emotions—anger in particular—even when these 
actions have no negative consequences on other people. In such investigation it was revealed 
that anger was associated to the belief that a moral transgression harmed the rights of other 
people, although the action was described as private and secret. 
In this investigation we proposed that such presumed harm can be extended to symbolic 
entities such as nature and the community in cases in which no one has been actually harmed, 
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making it compatible with the moral dumbfounding effect and the social intuitionist model. 
This extension allows investigating whether other emotions apart from anger are implicated 
in the presumption of harm to symbolic entities such as the rights of other people, or the 
traditions of the community. In addition, another theoretical account suggests that disgust 
‘moralises’ evaluations associated to violations of the domain of divinity, so that the presence 
of disgust makes evaluations about divinity violations more severe (Horberg, Keltner, Oveis, 
& Cohen, 2009). 
Most research (e.g. The CAD hypothesis) relates the emotion of anger to violations of the 
domain of autonomy, which is usually associated to harm to the individual. However, in 
cases in which there is no real harm to an individual the emotion of disgust seems to provide 
an avenue to ascribe harm to a harmless moral violation in the form of presumed harm. This 
situation brings an interesting question: What emotion, anger or disgust, is associated to harm 
in harmless taboo violations? On one hand, the large majority of theoretical accounts have 
proposed that anger is the result of harm. On the other hand results have shown that in moral 
violations, disgust is closely related to harm in the form of a ‘moralising’ agent (Horberg et 
al., 2009), a presumption of harm to symbolic entities such as other’s rights (Gutierrez & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2007), or as an intuitive response (Haidt, 2001). 
We propose that in the case of harmless taboo violations, specific emotions will be 
associated to different types of harm. As in, we refer here to taboo violation as norms whose 
violation can be expected to provoke inflexible, disgust-related responses and, in particular, 
norms related to the body, food, and sexuality. The different types of harm are related to the 
‘big three’ moral codes proposal (Shweder, Munch, Mahaptra, & Park, 1997), so that the 
moralisation of moral violations due to disgust (Horberg et al., 2009), can be explained based 
on presumption of harm to nature; whereas the relationship autonomy violations and anger 
can be explained as presumption of harm to an individual. 
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It is expected that when participants are presented with a harmless moral violation, their 
evaluation will be negative based on a presumption of harm to a symbolic entity such as 
rights and the community. Also, it is expected that the reported harm can be separated in 
different types such as individual harm (violation of the autonomy code), community harm 
(violation of the community code), and harm to nature (violation of the divinity code). 
Finally, it is expected that the emotion of anger, but not disgust, will be most associated to 




Seventy-nine participants of the Norwich Arts Centre and the Norwich Environmental 
Centre responded individually to a questionnaire on a voluntary basis. Of these, 43 were 
males and 36 were females. 
Design 
This experiment had a single factor with 2 levels between participants design (Condition: 
Taboo vs. Control). 
Materials  
The questionnaire consisted in a booklet that contained one fictitious story that was 
modified to create two different conditions, whether the main character of the story 
performed either a taboo action (a scientist eating a portion of meat cloned from her own 
arm) or a non-taboo action (a scientist drinking drug that alters memory). These stories were 
taken from Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007, Experiment 2). In both cases, no explicit 
actual harm to others was described as a result of the action of the main character of the story. 
Harm to nature: All responses were given in bipolar scales from 1 (Not at all) to 9 
(extremely.) Two items measured the perceived harm to nature as a result of the scientist 
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action. “Do you think the action of the scientist caused any damage to the natural order of 
things?” and “Do you think the action of the scientist violated the laws of nature? 
Community harm: Two items measured the perceived harm to the community as a result 
of the scientist action. “Do you think the action of the scientist caused any damage to the 
community?” and “Do you think the action of the scientist violated the rights of anyone apart 
from her?” 
Individual harm: Three items measured the perceived harm to other people. “Do you 
think the action of the scientist caused any physical harm to anyone?”, “Do you think the 
action of the scientist caused any psychological harm to anyone?” and “Do you think the 
action of the scientist caused any emotional harm to anyone?” 
Evaluation of the action: The evaluation of the action of the main character of the story 
was measured with four items in the form of bipolar scales from 1 (completely right / good / 
correct / positive) to 9 (Completely wrong / bad / incorrect / negative). 
Emotion items. In the verbal emotion items, participants were asked to indicated to what 
extent each story made them feel anger, compassion, depression, disgust, happiness, 
infuriation, outraged, pity, pleasure, repulsion, sadness, satisfaction, sickness, sorrow, 
sympathy, grossed-out and contempt. These measures were answered in scales from 1 (not at 
all) to 8 (very). In the facial emotion items, two photographs of female faces were shown, one 
showing disgust in the full form and the other showing anger in the open mouth form. Both 
expressions fulfil the requirements to be considered prototypical emotions based on the Facial 
Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Participants were instructed to 
"select the face that best describes your feelings towards the scientist now". Immediately after 
selecting a facial expression, participants were asked to indicate separately how much of each 
of the feelings represented by each face they had towards the scientist in scales from 1 (not at 
all) to 9 (extremely). 
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Procedure 
After the presentation of the story the participants were requested to answer the items 
regarding the harm to nature, the community and the individual. The order of the questions 
was changed in a cyclical way, so that some participants read the questions related to harm to 
nature first, other participants read the questions associated to the community harm first, and 
other participants read the harm to nature questions first. After that, all participants answered 
the items regarding the evaluation of the action, followed by the verbal and facial measures of 
emotions. Finally, all participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Evaluation of the action 
The four evaluation items (Cronbach’s alpha = .88) were averaged to create one single 
score. Analysis of variance on the evaluation score showed a significant main effect of 
Condition F (1, 79) = 8.71, MSE = 2.60, p < .01, indicating that the taboo action was 
evaluated more negatively than the non-taboo action. Means and standard deviations are 
shown in 
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Table 1. 
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of evaluations, harm and emotions by condition 
 Condition 
 No Taboo Taboo 
Evaluation 4.56 (1.24) 5.63 (1.94) 
Individual harm 2.56 (1.58) 3.53 (2.03) 
Harm to nature 3.01 (2.18) 5.38 (2.89) 
Harm to community 2.46 (2.03) 3.13 (2.16) 
Verbal anger 1.70 (1.69) 2.18 (1.28) 
Verbal disgust 1.51 (.82) 3.39 (2.19) 
Facial anger 1.68 (1.21) 2.29 (2.04) 
Facial disgust 1.95 (1.76) 3.61 (2.65) 
Combined score Anger -.18 (.74) .19 (.90) 
Combined score Disgust -.41 (.45) .44 (1.05) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
Individual, Nature and Community Harm 
Principal components analysis with varimax rotation was used to explore the existence of 
the proposed 3 types of harm. A factor analysis requesting 3 factors explained 83.42 % of the 
variance and showed three distinctive factors, one related to harm to the individual, one 
related to harm to nature and one related to harm to the community. Confirmatory factor 
analysis was used to compare the fitness of the data with three different models. A two-factor 
model (Individual harm vs. nature-community harm), a three-factor model (individual vs. 
nature vs. community) in which the factors were not correlated, and a three-factor model 
(individual vs. nature vs. community) in which the factors were correlated. Results revealed 
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that the third model was better than the other two, being the one showing the best fit (Table 
2). 
A mixed model analysis of variance with a 3 (Harm: Natural vs. Community vs. 
Individual, within participants factor) x 2 (Condition: Taboo vs. No Taboo, between 
participants factor) revealed significant main effects of Harm, F (2, 154) = 16.77, MSE = 
2.62, p 
< .001, and Condition F (1, 77) = 11.85, MSE = 8.92, p < .001. Importantly, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant Harm x Condition interaction F (2, 154) = 6.20, MSE = 
2.62, p < .01. Simple effect analysis revealed that the taboo manipulation had no significant 
effect on harm to the community F (1, 77) = 2.00, MSE = 4.40, p = .16, whereas there was a 
significant effect on individual harm, F (1, 77) = 5.67, MSE = 3.28, p < .05, increasing the 
perception of harm in the Taboo condition compared to the No Taboo condition; and an even 
larger effect of harm to nature F (1, 77) = 17.09, MSE = 6.48, p < .001. 
 
Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis results and goodness of fit indicators 
 χ2 df p RMSEA CFI NFI 
Two factors 44.74 13 <.001 .19 .89 .86 
Three uncorrelated 
factors 
64.80 16 <.001 .20 .83 .79 
Three correlated factors  6.74 11 .82 0 1.00 .98 
 




Verbal measures. The 3 items related to anger (anger, infuriation and outraged; 
Cronbach's alpha = .78), and the 4 items regarding disgust (disgust, sick, repulsed and 
grossed-out; Cronbach's alpha = .93) were averaged to create one index for each emotion. 
These indexes were correlated at r (77) = .61, p < .001. A mixed model analysis of variance 
adding a 2 (Emotion: Anger vs. Disgust, within participants) factor to the basic design 
revealed significant main effects of Emotion F (1, 77) = 12.02, MSE = 0.87, p < .001, and 
Condition F (1, 77) = 16.73, MSE = 3.29, p < .001. A significant interaction between these 
factors was also present F (1, 77) = 23.35, MSE = 0.87, p < .001. Simple effect analysis 
revealed that the manipulation had a stronger effect on the index of disgust, F (1, 77) = 26.29, 
MSE = 2.66, p < .001, than on the index of anger, F (1, 77) = 3.04, MSE = 1.50, p = .09. 
Means and standard deviations are in 
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Table 1. 
Facial measures. Nine participants did not select any of the faces, all of them in the 
control condition. Analysis of the remaining responses revealed that the correlation between 
the faces selected was r (77) = .41, p < .001. The face representing disgust was selected more 
overall (53 times, 75.7 %), than the face representing anger (17 times, 24.3 %). Further 
analysis revealed that this pattern was repeated for both conditions, but the effect was 
stronger in the Taboo condition. 
The face representing anger was more correlated with the index related to anger words r 
(77) = .41, p < .001, than with the index representing disgust words, r (77) = .23, p < .05, this 
differences was marginally significant t (76) = 1.94, p = .06. Likewise, the face representing 
disgust was more correlated with the disgust index r (77) = .63, p < .001, than with the anger 
index r (77) = .39, p < .001, this difference was significant t (76) = 2.97, p < .01. A mixed 
model analysis of variance with a 2 (Face: anger vs. disgust within participants) factor, 
replacing the words measures with the facial measures revealed significant main effects of 
Face F (1, 77) = 9.97, MSE = 2.48, p < .01, and Condition F (1, 77) = 9.59, MSE = 5.26, p < 
.01, as well as a significant interaction between these factors F (1, 77) = 4.36, MSE = 2.48, p 
< .05, indicating that there was a significantly higher reported level of disgust than anger in 
the Taboo condition, t (37) = 2.84, p < .01, but no significant difference between the 
emotions in the No Taboo condition t (40) = 1.21, p = .23 (
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Table 1).  
One index for each emotion was created averaging the standard value of the faces and 
words measures of each emotion. These scores were correlated at r (77) = .54, p < .001. 
Analysis of such scores using a 2 (Emotion: anger vs. disgust, within participants factor) x 2 
(Condition: Taboo vs. No Taboo, between participants factor) mixed model analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F (1, 77) = 14.94, MSE = 0.99, p < 
.001, suggesting a higher overall indication of anger and disgust in the disgust condition than 
in the control condition. The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F (1, 77) = .01, 
MSE = .019, p = .92, but it was qualified by a significant Emotion x Condition interaction, F 
(1, 77) = 6.91, MSE = 0.32, p < .05. These results suggest that the Taboo action had a 
significant effect on both emotions, but a stronger effect on disgust, F (1, 77) = 22.36, MSE = 
0.64, p < .001, than on anger, F (1, 77) = 4.09, MSE = 0.68, p < .05. 
Type of Harm and Emotions 
The relationship between the 3 types of harm and the emotions of anger and disgust was 
analysed using a bootstrap technique following the procedure and macros in Preacher and 
Hayes (2004). The independent effect of the Taboo manipulation was entered as a predictor 
of the 3 types of harm in separate analysis and the 2 combined indexes of anger and disgust 
were entered as simultaneous mediators between the taboo manipulation and the type of harm 
analysed. Results using unstandardised coefficients (B values) showed that the manipulation 
had a significant effect on both emotions, but it was stronger on disgust than in anger. In 
addition, the manipulation was significant on individual harm and harm to nature, but not on 
the community harm. As expected, anger but not disgust significantly predicted individual 
harm (Figure 1), whereas disgust but not anger significantly predicted harm to nature (Figure 
2). Harm to the community was not predicted by anger or disgust (Figure 3).  
Figure 1. Anger, disgust and taboo manipulation on individual harm 
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Figure 2. Anger, disgust and taboo manipulation on harm to nature 
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Figure 3. Anger, disgust and taboo manipulation on community harm 
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The taboo manipulation had a clear effect on the evaluation of the action and on the emotions 
of anger and disgust. It was expected hat such manipulation would make the moral judgement 
of the action more severe even when no negative consequences were described in the 
scenarios. 
The results confirmed that participants not only evaluated the taboo actions more 
negatively, but they associate harm to them. The presence of harm even when is none 
described is consistent with the presumption of harm model (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
2007), in which participants ascribe harm to symbolic entities in order to justify negative 
emotions and evaluations to a harmless but disgusting act. 
 
Discussion 
These results also provide support for the ‘big three’ theory of morality (Shweder et al., 
1997), separating moral violations in the domain of autonomy, community and divinity. 
These results also provide support to the CAD hypothesis, which proposes a correspondence 
between moral violations and specific emotions (Rozin et al., 1999). The results in this 
experiment showed that the taboo manipulation—a violation of the divinity code—had a 
stronger effect on the emotion of disgust than anger, and a stronger effect on the natural harm 
than the other types of harm. Importantly, the results presented here suggest that a moral 
violation is not restricted to one moral code, but that a violation of the code of divinity also 
has an effect on the code of autonomy and the emotion of anger. 
These results suggest that private actions without negative consequences to others may 
give rise to the presumption of harm from negative emotions such as anger and disgust. It is 
important to note that this experiment described an action related to “core disgust”, which is 
related to contamination and food. There is a possibility that other types of moral violations 
that cause other types of disgust can be associated more to harm to the community. An 
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example is the case of homosexuality, which in some cases has been has been associated with 
socio-moral disgust, arguing that the existence of homosexual relationships is a threat to the 
institution of the family. 
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